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INSURANCE
H. Alston Johnson* & W. Shelby McKenzie*
LIFE INSURANCE
Decisions during this term on the subject of life insurance were,
for the most part, unremarkable. There were the usual disagreements
over applicable prescriptive periods,' and assertions of liability for failure
to procure coverage or refusal to insure after the applicant believed that
insurance would be issued. 2 But the decision in In re Hamilton,' con-
cerning the rights of a beneficiary who causes the death of the insured,
raises very important questions of policy and statutory interpretation
which should be considered in more detail in this forum.
The insured and the beneficiary lived in a so-called "common-law
spouse" relationship. On one particular evening, Mr. Hamilton was
intoxicated, and a violent argument ensued. His "spouse" stabbed him
several times, inflicting fatal wounds.
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* Members, Louisiana Bar Association.
1. Davis v. Security Indus. Ins. Co., 446 So. 2d 419 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1984) (The
plaintiff brought suit on life insurance policy eighteen months after insured's death, despite
a policy provision limiting such an action to one year and 60-day period after death; the
court upheld the policy restriction on limitation of action, especially in light of plaintiff's
having had possession of policy and not having offered any excuse for his untimely
demand.); Lord v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 434 So. 2d 1179 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1983)
(The cestui que vie mysteriously disappeared; the last date for coverage under group policy
was April 28, 1969 and suit was filed on April 23, 1980; the court held that the 10-year
prescriptive period of the Civil Code was applicable.).
2. Beam v. Intercontinental Life Ins. Co., 447 So. 2d 12 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1984)
(reasonable diligence on the part of an agent, and no reliance on the part of an insured
who did not cooperate in obtaining medical examination; no policy issued); Davis &
Landry, Inc. v. Guaranty Income Life Ins. Co., 442 So. 2d 621 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1983)
(No unreasonable delay in processing application; the premium receipt language did not
provide coverage because of conditions requiring risk approval before coverage attached.);
Kieffer v. Southern United Life Ins. Co., 437 So. 2d 919 (La. App. 2d Cir.), cert. denied,
442 So. 2d 456 (La. 1983) (A credit life request was involved; the bank issued the
certificate with notice of the right to decline coverage within 31 days; within the stated
term, the insurer declined coverage; the cancellation was held to be effective.).
3. 446 So. 2d 463 (La. App. 4th Cir.), cert. denied, 448 So. 2d 105 (La. 1984)
(Calogero, Dennis & Lemmon, JJ., specially concurring in writ denial with the comment
that "the statute in question prohibits recovery by a beneficiary adjudged guilty of an
intentional act which results in his criminal responsibility for the insured's death.").
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His assailant pleaded guilty to a charge of manslaughter under
Louisiana Revised Statutes 14:31. 4 A dispute arose over the distribution
of the proceeds of a life insurance policy on his life. His legal spouse
and children claimed those proceeds for the estate as against the claims
of the assailant, contending that under Louisiana Revised Statutes
22:613(D) she would not be entitled to her rights as beneficiary under
the policy because she was "criminally responsible" for the death of
the insured.' Noting some ambiguity in the statute, 6 the court nonetheless
held that the plea to manslaughter resulted in a holding of criminal
responsibility for the death of the insured. Thus, it reversed the summary
judgment in favor of the assailant and granted that of the legal spouse
and children.
Every jurisdiction must face the question of a potential bar to
recovery of the policy proceeds by the beneficiary due to his own
conduct. These cases almost always involve the homicide of the insured
at the hands of the beneficiary, and Louisiana has its share of such
cases. The primary issues in most cases are a factual determination of
whether the killing may have been justifiable, even in a criminal sense,
and whether the presence or absence of a criminal conviction will be
conclusive in a civil proceeding involving the insurance proceeds.
For most of its judicial history, Louisiana has resolved such problems
without the assistance of a statute. In one of the earliest cases reported,
a concubine had shot her paramour in what was established to be self-
defense (though she shot him in the back.)' The insurer provoked a
concursus proceeding to decide a dispute over the proceeds of a life
insurance policy between the beneficiary (the concubine) and the ad-
ministrator of the estate of the insured decedent. The trial court had
agreed with the administrator's argument that even though self-defense
might be shown, public policy would require that she not be entitled
to the proceeds of the policy. The appellate court disagreed, holding
that if the killing was in self-defense, it was the exercise of a "natural
4. Apparently, the plea was to a charge under the criminal code, La. R.S. 14:31(2)(a)
(1974): "Manslaughter is . . . (2) A homicide committed, without any intent to cause
death or great bodily harm. . . . (a) When the offender is engaged in the perpetration
or attempted perpetration. . . of any intentional misdemeanor directly affecting the person
5. See La. Insurance Code: La. R.S. 22:613(D) [hereinafter cited as La. Ins. Code]:
No beneficiary, assignee, or other payee under any personal insurance contract
shall receive from the insurer any benefits thereunder accruing upon the death
• . . of the individual insured when said beneficiary . . . is held by a final
judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction to be criminally responsible for
the death . . . of the individual insured . . ..
6. For other aspects of the decision centering on these issues, see Johnson, Devel-
opments in the Law, 1983-84-Legislative Procedure and Interpretation, 45 La. L. Rev.
341, 342 (1984).
7. National Life & Acc. Ins. Co. v. Turner, 174 So. 646 (La. App. Orl. 1937).
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right" of the beneficiary. Thus, she could not be denied the proceeds
on the alleged basis that she would profit from her own "wrongdoing."
Some dissent from this view may be found in Hollander v. Good
Citizens Mutual Benefit Association.8 A wife (the beneficiary of the
policy) had killed her husband (the insured) under circumstances in
which self-defense was a clear possibility. The policy contained a pro-
vision denying coverage if the insured's death was the result of a
"violation of law." The court held that under either version of the
facts, the wife could not recover under the policy. If the beneficiary
had not acted in self-defense, then the homicide was clearly in violation
of law. Furthermore, even if she had acted in self-defense, the insured's
conduct directed at her was in violation of law. 9 Thus, the court reversed
the lower court's award of the policy proceeds to the attorney to whom
they had been assigned by the wife-an incidental point of which the
court took no formal notice. The court distinguished the case discussed
in the preceding paragraph on the ground that the opinion did not
reflect that the policy contained a "violation of law" clause requiring
denial of benefits. Curiously, Hollander has never been cited for its
interpretation of the "violation of law" provision in this factual context.
Whatever comfort insurers might have gotten from Hollander prob-
ably was destroyed by the decision of the supreme court in American
National Life Insurance Co. v. Shaddinger.0 Again, the combatants
were the spouses, and the beneficiary claimed to have killed the insured
in self-defense. Citing numerous cases from other jurisdictions, the court
announced the rule that a beneficiary named in a life insurance policy
is not entitled to the proceeds of the insurance if he or she "feloniously
kills the insured." But it also noted that the intentional killing by the
beneficiary of the person insured, if committed in lawful self-defense,
will not prevent the beneficiary from claiming the proceeds of the
insurance on his life. Nothing in the opinion suggested that a "violation
of law" clause was at issue, so Hollander was not even mentioned,
8. 193 So. 903 (La. App. Orl. 1940). Cf. Davis v. Unity Life Ins. Co., 43 So. 2d
67 (La. App. Orl. 1949) (A reversal of the judgment for the beneficiary and remanded
for the taking of additional evidence on the circumstances of death; the insurer was urging
the defense of no coverage when death results from intentional act of person other than
insured-presumably whether felonious or not.).
9. The two Louisiana cases cited by the court in support of its reasoning did not
involve a homicide by the beneficiary in alleged self-defense. One was a denial of benefits
on the ground that the insured was intoxicated when killed in a traffic accident he probably
caused, and the other was a denial because the insured was participating in an illegal
card game when shot by another participant. Geddes & Moss Undertaking & Embalming
Co. v. First Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 167 So. 881 (La. App. Orl. 1936) (The plaintiff was a
funeral home which had been assigned the policy proceeds by a beneficiary); Landry v.
Independent Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 135 So. 110 (La. App. Orl. 1931) (The plaintiff was
the actual beneficiary.).
10. 205 La. 11, 16 So. 2d 889 (1944).
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much less overruled. In effect, the court permitted the beneficiary to
recover under circumstances which established an assault with a deadly
weapon by the insured on the beneficiary. Under these circumstances,
one could argue that Shaddinger did not deny the possibility that if the
policy had contained a "violation of law" provision, the court could
have concluded that the insured's conduct was such a violation and
could have denied recovery regardless of whether the beneficiary acted
in self-defense or not.
If there were any "violation of law" provisions in the policies at
issue, subsequent Louisiana decisions do not mention them. Louisiana
courts' resolution of the issue usually is limited to permitting recovery
for the beneficiary if the facts justify a finding of self-defense" and
denying recovery if they do not justify such a finding. 12
In appropriate cases, our courts have had to deal with requested
extensions of the basic propositions discussed above. It has been held
that when the beneficiary/widow and the insured decedent spouse lived
together in a community of acquets and gains, the felonious killing of
the insured by the beneficiary not only dissolves the community, but
causes the forfeit of any potential interest in the policy proceeds which
the beneficiary/widow might have had. 3 A guilty plea by the beneficiary
to a criminal charge of felonious killing was held admissible in a civil
proceeding involving disposition of the policy proceeds, but is not con-
clusive as a matter of law.' 4 If it can be shown that the beneficiary
has fradulently procured the insurance without the insured's consent as
a part of a scheme to kill the spouse for the insurance proceeds, the
policy is null, even with respect to the estate of the insured and his
heirs at law. 5
In 1979, very possibly as a result of a celebrated case in which a
beneficiary spouse had poisoned her husband and later sought recovery
11. See, e.g., Provident Life & Acc. Ins. Co. v. Carter, 345 So. 2d 1245 (La. App.
1st Cir. 1977).
12. See, e.g., Southern Life & Health Ins. Co. v. Mack, 17 So. 2d 370 (La. App.
Orl. 1944), (The testimony of a blind "witness" to the killing was accepted over that of
the beneficiary in order to hold that the killing was not in self-defense; the proceeds were
awarded to the estate of the insured and to the heirs at law.).
13. Succession of Butler, 147 So. 2d 684 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1962) (Beneficiary charged
with murder and pled to manslaughter; assignee of her purported interest in proceeds had
no right to them.).
14. Smith v. Southern Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 134 So. 2d 337 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1961).
See Note, Insurance-Felonious Killing of Insured by Beneficiary, 36 Tul. L. Rev. 579
(1962). Hamilton might suggest a change in this position.
15. Flood v. Fidelity & Guar. Life Ins. Co., 394 So. 2d 1311 (La. App. 1st Cir.)
(The wife had earlier been convicted of poisoning her husband and a criminal conviction
reflected economic motives for doing so involving an insurance policy on his life; the
court held that the policy had been obtained on a fraudulent basis and denied recovery
to the "estate" of the murdered spouse, which recovery would probably have inured to
the benefit of the only child of the marriage.), cert. denied, 399 So. 2d 608 (1981).
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on the policy she had obtained as a part of her scheme,' 6 the legislature
provided a statutory basis for the disqualification of a beneficiary. The
statute prohibits the receipt of any proceeds of a life insurance policy
by a "beneficiary, assignee or other payee" when such a person "is
held by a final judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction to be
criminally responsible" for the death of the insured. The prohibition
extends neither to payment of funeral expenses for the insured under
an assignment, nor to payment under a facility of payment clause (unless
to the disqualified person). 17
The codification, while aimed at an entirely laudatory objective, is
not wholly satisfactory. In the first place, its standard for disqualification
is not completely consistent with the standards for disqualification of
an intestate heir or of a legatee (as they read as of this writing). A
person is unworthy of succeeding as an intestate heir if he has been
"convicted of having killed, or attempted to kill, the deceased," as well
as upon other grounds not pertinent here."a A legatee may not receive
his legacy if he has "unlawfully taken the life of the testator"; in such
a case, the legacy is deemed to be revoked as a result of his conduct.' 9
A simple example will demonstrate the inconsistencies among these var-
ious standards. Assume that W and H are a childless couple. Each has
16. The Flood case cited in the immediately preceding footnote.
17. See La. Ins. Code § 613(D) which states:
No beneficiary, assignee, or other payee under any personal insurance contract
shall receive from the insurer any benefits thereunder accruing upon the death,
disablement, or injury of the individual insured when said beneficiary, assignee,
or other payee who is held by a final judgment of a court of competent
jurisdiction to be criminally responsible for the death, disablement or injury of
the individual insured. Where such a disqualification exists, the policy proceeds
shall be payable to the secondary or contingent beneficiary, unless similarly
disqualified, or, if no secondary -or contingent beneficiary exists, to the estate
of the insured. Provided, that nothing contained herein shall prohibit payment
pursuant to an assignment of the policy proceeds where such payment defrays
the cost and expenses of the insured's funeral or expense incurred in connection
with medical treatment of the insured. Provided, also, that nothing contained
herein shall prohibit payment of insurance proceeds pursuant to a facility of
payment clause, so long as such payment is not made to a beneficiary, assignee
or other payee disqualified by this Section.
18. See La. Civ. Code art. 966 ("Persons unworthy of inheriting, and, as such,
deprived of the successions to which they are called, are the following: (1) Those who
are convicted of having killed, or attempted to kill, the deceased; and in this respect they
will not be the less unworthy, though they may have been pardoned after their conviction.
(2) Those who have brought against the deceased some accusation found calumnious,
which tended to subject the deceased to an infamous or capital punishment. (3) Those
who, being apprised of the murder of the deceased, have not taken measures to bring
the murderer to justice.").
19. La. Civ. Code art. 1691(6) ("However, in all cases, a legacy or disposition shall
be deemed revoked in the event that the legatee has unlawfully taken the life of the
testator, and said legacy or disposition shall be deemed not written.").
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a sibling. Each has a testament naming the other as universal legatee.
There is a life insurance policy on the life of husband naming wife as
beneficiary. Assume that W shoots H (not in self-defense) and then
commits suicide. W will never be "convicted" of having killed H under
the intestate heir provision for the simple reason that a criminal pros-
ecution abates upon the death of the accused. But since the standard
for revocation of a legacy is not limited to a conviction, it could arguably
be established in a civil proceeding that she had "unlawfully" taken
her husband's life. But if the contingent beneficiary is the "estate" of
H, might she not receive the right to his share of the community as
his intestate heir, which would then pass to her sibling upon her death?
Additionally, with respect to the proceeds of the policy, can it not also
be said that no court of competent jurisdiction could ever hold her
"criminally responsible" for her husband's death, due to her own death?
And if that is true, does not the wife then have a right to the policy
proceeds, a right which will subsequently belong to her sibling at her
death?
These interpretations lead to a disturbing result. All of the com-
munity property (W's half and H's half) and the insurance proceeds
ultimately belong to W's sibling rather than H's sibling, even though
W's sibling's rights must of necessity derive completely from the rights
of W, who murdered her husband. 20
The foregoing problems can be resolved by amending the statutes
governing the question of disqualification of intestate successors, testate
successors, and policy beneficiaries so that the same standard will apply
to all three. This assumes, of course, that the policy decision is made
that all such successors should be treated alike-there appears to be no
reason why they should not.
Any proposed amendment must deal with the additional problems
posed by the language of Louisiana Revised Statutes 22:613(D) as it
presently reads. That statute provides that a beneficiary is disqualified
if, by final judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction, he is held
to be "criminally responsible" for the death of the insured. Is this
meant to be the equivalent of a criminal conviction, and if so, why did
the legislature not say so specifically? Could this mean that a court
exercising civil jurisdiction could conclude that the beneficiary "would
have been criminally responsible" if he had been tried in a criminal
proceeding and disqualify him on that basis? If so, should it use the
criminal standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt to do so?
20. See Succession of Medica, 163 So. 2d 425 (La. App. 2d Cir.) (The husband killed
his wife and then committed suicide; the court refused to hold him an unworthy heir
because the statute called for a "conviction" because of the killing of his wife; due to
his death, he was never convicted of the crime.), cert. denied, 246 La. 379, 164 So. 2d
362 (1964).
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A person may be "criminally responsible" for a death though not
guilty of "intentional" homicide-if convicted of manslaughter, for
example. This would be broader than the prior jurisprudential rule of
"intentional and felonious" killing. The Hamilton decision seemingly
indicates that this broader ruling may prevail.
In addition, the term "criminally responsible" is imprecise, a prob-
lem that the court in Hamilton encountered. A person who dies before
the completion of a criminal proceeding will never be convicted of the
crime, though he might be considered "criminally responsible" by some.
A person acquitted of a crime by reason of insanity is not convicted
but might also be considered by some to be "criminally responsible."'"
The assailant in Hamilton was "criminally responsible" for an assault,
but should she be considered "criminally responsible" for the death if
convicted under the portion of the Criminal Code dealing with non-
intentional homicide? The court in Hamilton thought she should:
When Joann Hamilton pled guilty to manslaughter she admitted
criminal responsibility for Mr. Hamilton's death, notwithstanding
her contention that she did not intend to kill him. There is no
doubt that Joann Hamilton's intentional assault on Mr. Ham-
ilton contributed to his death. The statute does not require more
than a finding by a court of competent jurisdiction that the
beneficiary was criminally responsible for the death of the in-
sured. 22
One must also consider whether the statute is intended to be exclusive.
Whatever "criminally responsible" may be intended to mean, is this the only
basis upon which a person may be disqualified. The jurisprudence prior to
the statute did not appear to be based upon criminal conviction, through
the court usually spoke of "felonious and intentional" killing. The statute
does not provide that its standard is the only basis upon which disqualifica-
tion may be based, but rather that disqualification occurs if its tenets are
satisfied. The court did not have to face that question in Hamilton, since
it held that the statutory requirement was fulfilled.
These are not idle academic questions. In California- Western States
Life Insurance v. Sanford,2 the court dealt with a number of them.
An estranged husband had killed his wife, but was acquitted of the
criminal charge on the basis of insanity. The insurer commenced an
interpleader action to resolve the dispute between the husband/beneficiary
and the children who would inherit the proceeds (if payable to the estate
21. See California-Western States Life Ins. Co. v. Sanford, 515 F. Supp. 524 (E.D.
La. 1981).
22. 446 So. 2d at 465.
23. 515 F. Supp. 524 (E.D. La. 1981).
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as a secondary beneficiary). The husband sought a summary judgment
on the basis that Louisiana Revised Statutes 22:613(D) was the exclusive
ground for disqualification and that since he had been acquitted of the
crime, he could not be disqualified as beneficiary. The court denied the
motion on several grounds. First, the court reasoned that the absence
of the word "conviction" from the statute suggested that a Civil court
could find "criminal responsibility" sufficient to deny recovery under
the policy. Second, the court concluded that the statute must be inter-
preted as an extension of the jurisprudential principles evolved by the
Louisiana courts rather than as an abrogation of them. Thus, the stat-
ute's intent was to make a criminal conviction conclusive as to dis-
qualification and thereby to relieve the opposing party of proving
disqualification. But it was not meant to require a conviction as a
prerequisite to disqualification, since that previously had not been the
law. The court therefore held that the children were entitled to litigate
the issue of their father's sanity in a civil proceeding, and inferentially
held that they would be entitled to the proceeds of the policy as heirs
if they proved he was sufficiently sane to satisfy traditional Louisiana
jurisprudential principles.
Legislative clarification of Louisiana Revised Statutes 22:613(D) and
the Civil Code articles on disqualification of heirs and legatees is needed.
Such amendments should be much more specific than the present pro-
visions. If it is sufficient to disqualify a successor that he had been
involved 24 in the "intentional and unjustifiable" killing of the person
in question (regardless of the presence or absence of a criminal con-
viction) that should be clearly stated. Such a statement, while not only
much clearer in its expression of the ground upon which disqualification
is based, would also eliminate all of the problems emanating from the
various reasons for which a criminal conviction might not be obtained
(excluded evidence, death of accused, insanity, and others). The amend-
ments should also make clear whether other non-intentional, but none-
theless "criminal" acts might suffice for disqualification: negligent
homicide, vehicular homicide, and other conduct of a reckless, though
not intentional, nature.
Due to the different nature of the criminal trial process, disquali-
fication of civil successors such as beneficiaries and heirs should not be
tied to that process. Rather, one should identify the type of conduct
which should bar a civil successor and then require it to be proved in
a civil proceeding. There is nothing wrong with making conviction of
a crime involving intentional homicide an automatic disqualification.
24. This word would be broad enough to include the "contract killing" of one
spouse by the other, for example, even though the conspirator spouse was not actually
the killer.
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However, it should remain open to claimants to establish disqualification
on specific statutory grounds other than a criminal conviction, such as




Louisiana Revised Statutes 22:1406(D)(1)(a) provides that no "au-
tomobile liability insurance covering liability arising out of the ownership,
maintenance, or use of any motor vehicle" shall be issued unless un-
insured motorist (UM) coverage is provided therein with the same limits
as the bodily injury liability coverage (unless the insured rejects such
coverage or select lower limits). 25 In Southern American Insurance Co.
v. Dobson,26 the plaintiff was driving a truck owned by Dobson Pulp-
wood Company when he was severely injured through the negligence of
an underinsured motorist. Plaintiff claimed UM coverage under three
policies issued to Dobson Pulpwood. Aetna issued an automobile liability
policy specifically covering the truck, which provided both liability and
UM coverage with $100,000 limits. Southern American issued a com-
mercial umbrella liability insurance policy which provided liability cov-
erage up to a limit of $1,000,000 in excess of the limits of underlying
liability policies including the Aetna automobile liability policy. In ad-
dition, Dobson Pulpwood obtained a commercial excess umbrella liability
25. La. Ins. Code § 1406(D)(l)(a):
No automobile liability insurance covering liability arising out of the ownership,
maintenance, or use of any motor vehicle shall be delivered or issued for delivery
in this state with respect to any motor vehicle registered or principally garaged
in this state unless coverage is provided therein or supplemental thereto, in not
less than the limits of bodily injury liability provided by the policy, under
provisions filed with and approved by the commissioner of insurance, for the
protection of persons insured thereunder who are legally entitled to recover
damages from owners or operators of uninsured or underinsured motor vehicles
because of bodily injury, sickness, or disease, including death, resulting there-
from; provided, however that the coverage required under this Subsection shall
not be applicable where any insured named in the policy shall reject in writing
the coverage or selects lower limits. Such coverage need not be provided in or
supplemental to a renewal or substitute policy where the named insured has
rejected the coverage or selected lower limits in connection with a policy pre-
viously issued to him by the same insurer. Any document signed by the named
insured or his legal representative which initially rejects such coverage or selects
lower limits shall be conclusively presumed to become a part of the policy or
contract when issued and delivered, irrespective of whether physically attached
thereto.
26. 441 So. 2d 1185 (La. 1983).
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policy from Northeastern with coverage in the amount of $2,000,000 in
excess of the Southern and other underlying policies. Although the
Southern and Northeastern policies provided excess automobile liability
insurance, neither policy expressly afforded uninsured motorist protec-
tion, nor had either company obtained a written waiver of UM coverage
from the named insured. Both Southern and Northeastern filed suits
for declaratory judgments that their policies did not provide UM cov-
erage. The trial court entered judgment against the insurers. The third
circuit court of appeal reversed, holding that Louisiana Revised Statutes
22:1406(D)(l)(a) required UM coverage only under an automobile liability
policy and that umbrella policies were not automobile liability policies
within the meaning of the UM statute.2 7 On original hearing with three
dissents, the Louisiana Supreme Court affirmed. On rehearing, again
with three dissents, the supreme court reversed the decision of the court
of appeal, holding that Louisiana Revised Statutes 22:1406(D)(1)(a) man-
dates UM coverage, not just under an automobile liability policy, but
under any policy providing automobile liability insurance.2 s The majority
found such result dictated by the plain language of the statute and the
public policy considerations behind it.
Prior to Act 438 of 1977, the UM statute did not specify the form
or procedure required for effective rejection or selection of lower limits.29
This amendment required a document signed by the named insured or
his legal representative but did not require that the document be phys-
ically attached to the insurance policy. In A.L U. Insurance Co. v.
Roberts3 0 the Louisiana Supreme Court, in refusing to enforce an oral
selection of lower limits, held that a waiver of the mandatory coverage
prior to the September 9, 1977 (the effective date of the amendment)
was not enforceable unless in writing and attached to the policy pursuant
to the requirements of Louisiana Revised Statutes 22:628. The Roberts
decision left unanswered the question of whether an unattached written
rejection or selection of lower limits executed prior to the effective date
of the 1977 amendment would be.enforceable with respect to a renewal
policy issued after the 1977 amendment. This amendment eliminated the
requirement that such document be attached to the policy. Sentilles v.
State Farm Mutual Auto Insurance Co.3" held that a 1976 unattached
27. Southern Am. Ins. Co. v. Dobson, 415 So. 2d 641 (La. App. 3rd Cir. 1982)
and Northeastern Fire Ins. Co. v. Dobson, 415 So. 2d 644 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1982),
rev'd sub nom. Southern Am. Ins. Co. v. Dobson, 441 So. 2d 1185 (La. 1983).
28. Justice Blanche authored the original opinion and was joined by Justices Calogero,
Dennis, and Marcus. Chief Justice Dixon wrote the opinion on rehearing in which he
was joined by Justices Dennis, Lemmon, and Watson.
29. Act 438 of 1977 is incorporated in La. Ins. Code § 1406(D)(1)(a), quoted in note
25 supra.
30. 404 So. 2d 948 (La. 1981).
31. 443 So. 2d 723 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 445 So. 2d 437 (La.
1984).
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written selection of lower limits was not enforceable with respect to a
renewal policy issued after the 1977 amendment.3 2 The amendment did
not resurrect a waiver which was invalid when made.
Stacking
Act 623 of 1977, known as the "anti-stacking" provision, amended
Louisiana Revised Statutes 22:1406(D)(1)(c) to prohibit stacking of mul-
tiple UM coverages available to the same insured, except under express
limited circumstances. Many policies issued prior to the effective date
of Act 623 of 1977 contained "other insurance" clauses which, if en-
forceable, would prevent stacking. Prior to the amendment, such clauses
were unenforceable under the jurisprudential interpretation of the UM
statute. 3 The first, second, and third circuits held that the "other
insurance" clauses in pre-amendment policies were effective for post-
amendment accidents because the anti-stacking amendment removed the
judicial barrier to enforceability.34 In Block v. Reliance Insurance Co.31,
the Louisiana Supreme Court overturned this line of decisions, holding
that insurance policy contracts entered into prior to the amendment
included the mandatory provisions of the statute then in effect which
authorized stacking. Application of the anti-stacking provision to pre-
armendment policies would be a legislative impairment of contract, pro-
hibited by Article 1, Section 23 of the Louisiana Constitution of 1974.
The plaintiff in Block was permitted to stack the coverages for twelve
vehicles under a fleet policy.36
32. See also Stroud v. Liberty Mut. Ins., 429 So. 2d 492 (La. App. 3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 437 So. 2d 1147 (La. 1983). Other recent cases involving rejection of UM coverage
or selection of lower limits include: Aramburo v. Travelers Ins. Co., 426 So. 2d 260 (La.
App. 4th Cir.), cert. denied, 433 So. 2d 161 (La. 1983), phraseology altered, 438 So. 2d
274 (La. App. 4th Cir.) (holding that application which gave choices only of 5/10 limits
or rejection of coverage was not an effective selection of 5/10 limits), cert. denied, 443
So. 2d 1110 (La. 1983); Chiasson v. Whitney, 427 So.2d 470 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1983),
cert. denied, 433 So. 2d 180 (La. 1983) (holding that selection of lower limits signed by
agent was not effective); Smith v. Royal Globe Ins. Co., 424 So. 2d 1277 (La. App. 3d
Cir. 1982) (holding that written rejection of UM coverage as to all persons except certain
named individuals and their spouses was effective).
33. See Barbin v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 315 So. 2d 754 (La. 1975); Deane
v. McGee, 261 La. 686, 260 So. 2d 669 (1972); Graham v. American Cas. Co., 261 La.
85, 259 So. 2d 22 (1972). But cf. Seaton v. Kelley, 339 So. 2d 731 (La. 1976).
34. Block v. Reliance Ins. Co., 417 So. 2d 29 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1982) & Faria v.
Smoak, 416 So. 2d 132 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1982), rev'd sub nom Block v. Reliance Ins.
Co., 433 So. 2d 1040 (La. 1983); Hebert v. Breaux, 398 So. 2d 1299 (La. App. 3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 401 'So. 2d 986 (La. 1981). As noted above, writs were granted in both
Block and Faria, the cases were consolidated, and both decisions were reversed.
35. 433 So. 2d 1040 (La. 1983).
36. Jurisprudence under cases which arose prior to the 1977 amendment is conflicting
concerning stacking of multiple coverages under a fleet policy. Briley v. Falati, 367 So.
2d 1227 (La. App. 4th Cir.), cert. denied, 369 So. 2d 1379 (La. 1979), held that a person
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The exception contained in the anti-stacking provision permits a
person injured "while occupying an automobile not owned by said
injured party" to recover the UM coverage on the vehicle in which he
is riding (as primary coverage) and also under one other UM policy
available to him (as excess coverage). The finality of the selection of
the one excess policy was the issue before the Louisiana Supreme Court
in Taylor v. Tanner.37 The deceased was the occupant of a non-owned
car which was struck by an underinsured motorist. Plaintiffs accepted
the liability limits of the negligent motorist and the UM limits from
the insurers of the host driver and the deceased's auto, reserving rights
against the UM insurer of the deceased's employer. The employer's
insurer moved for summary judgment on the ground that the plaintiffs
could not stack an additional policy. The trial court granted the motion,
and the court of appeal affirmed the dismissal.38 The supreme court
reversed, holding that acceptance of the deceased's excess UM coverage
was conditional and did not bar recovery under the employer's coverage
so long as there was no ultimate recovery of excess UM coverage beyond
that provided by any one policy. The selection of an excess policy was
not irrevocable, and the insured may later opt for another policy. When
a subsequent selection was made, the court did not decide whether the
funds paid under the original policy should be refunded, whether such
payment should be credited against the liability of the subsequent selectee,
or whether the responsibility should be prorated between the two insurers
according to their policy limits.3 9
Justice Lemmon, concurring in the denial of rehearing in Southern
American Insurance Co. v. Dobson, makes it clear that the Dobson
decision did not resolve the complex stacking issue presented by the
facts of that case. Under the court's decision, the plaintiff had UM
insured only as an occupant of a vehicle was not entitled to stack separate UM coverages
on sixty-six vehicles insured under the same policy. In Holmes v. Reliance Ins. Co., 359
So. 2d 1102 (La. App. 3d Cir.), cert. denied, 362 So. 2d 1120 (La. 1978), the court
permitted stacking under a garage liability policy insuring 160 vehicles. The Louisiana
Supreme Court did not resolve the issue in Block. It held that the plaintiff in Block was
entitled to stack multiple coverages under a fleet policy because he was expressly named
as an additional insured under an endorsement.
37. 442 So. 2d 435 (La. 1983).
38. 422 So. 2d 1338 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1982).
39. Justice Dennis concurred, taking exception to any implication in the majority
opinion that the proceeds of multiple policies might be prorated. He agreed that an
insured might conditionally opt for one UM coverage and later elect to refund those
proceeds in favor of a larger coverage. He was of the opinion that the provisions of La.
Ins. Code § 1406(D)(1)(c) expressly prohibited recovery from more than one policy.
However, it would seem that proration could be justified under the statutory language if
it were read to limit the amount of recovery by the insured rather than the source of
funds. Where several insurers provide excess coverage, proration appears to be an equitable
method to allocate the ultimate responsibility.
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coverage under a primary policy and two layers of excess coverage. The
concurring opinion of Justice Lemmon indicates that Dobson does not
resolve the issue whether the anti-stacking provision 40 prohibits the in-
sured from recovery under both excess policies. The primary motivation
behind the anti-stacking provision was to overturn the jurisprudence
which authorized the stacking of multiple coverages issued on multiple
vehicles, whether such multiple vehicles were insured under the same or
separate policies. The legislature probably was not contemplating a sit-
uation in which the insured purchases several layers of primary and
excess UM coverage for the same vehicle. Since the UM statute specif-
ically authorizes an insured to increase his coverage to any amount,
4
'
there does not appear to be any reason to prohibit the insured from
purchasing such additional coverage under multiple policies. To reach
that result, however, the courts will have a difficult time dealing with
the express language of the anti-stacking provision.4
2
Residents
The Louisiana Supreme Court in Bearden v. Rucker43 considered
the issue whether a judicially separated spouse continued to be a resident
of her husband's household. The wife, who was awarded custody of
40. La. Ins. Code § 1406(D)(1)(c) (1978):
If the insured has any limits of uninsured motorist coverage in a policy of
automobile liability insurance, in accordance with the terms of Subsection D(l),
then such limits of liability shall not be increased because of multiple motor
vehicles covered under said policy of insurance and such limits of uninsured
motorist coverage shall not be increased when the insured has insurance available
to him under more than one uninsured motorist coverage provision or policy;
provided, however, that with respect to other insurance available, the policy of
insurance or endorsement shall provide the following:
With respect to bodily injury to an injured party while occupying an automobile
not owned by said injured party, the following priorities of recovery under
uninsured motorist coverage shall apply:
(i) The uninsured motorist coverage on the vehicle in which the injured party was
an occupant is primary;
(ii) Should that primary uninsured motorist coverage be exhausted due to the extent
of damages, then the injured occupant may recover as excess from other un-
insured motorist coverage available to him. In no instance shall more than one
coverage from more than one uninsured motorist policy be available as excess
over and above the primary coverage available to the injured occupant.
(Emphasis added).
41. La. Ins. Code § 1406(D)(l)(b) (1978) ("Any insurer delivering or issuing an
automobile liability insurance policy referred to herein shall also permit the insured, at
his written request, to increase the coverage applicable to uninsured motor vehicles provided
for herein to any amount.").
42. See emphasized language in La. Ins. Code § 1406(D)(l)(c) set forth in note 40
supra.
43. 437 So. 2d 1116 (La. 1983).
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her youngest son, lived in an apartment with her son and with the
wife's mother. All three were injured through the negligence of an
uninsured motorist while occupying an automobile owned by an unrelated
party. The issue for the court's determination was whether UM coverage
was afforded under a policy standing in the husband's name on an
automobile being used exclusively by the wife belonging to the former
community. Since the policy was in the husband's name, his wife would
not fall within the definition of the named insured unless she were a
resident of his household. 44 Likewise, the son and mother would have
UM coverage only if they were residents of the named insured's house-
hold. 4
The majority opinion suggested that residency is not solely dependent
upon living under the same roof, but rather the emphasis is upon
membership in a group and intention. The court pointed out that the
wife testified that she still considered reconciliation a possibility, that
there had been no division of the community property which continued
in joint ownership, and that the wife retained keys to the family home
which she visited several times a week and where she maintained be-
longings and was free to come and go as she pleased. Without explaining
the significance of this factor, the court also pointed out on several
occasions that the Insurance agent had knowledge of the wife's possession
of one of the cars when the policy was renewed after the separation.
Upon consideration of these factors, the majority reversed the holdings
of the two lower courts and found that the wife was a resident of her
husband's household.
The majority further concluded that the son and mother were also
insured under the policy. Since the wife fell within the definition of the
named insured as a spouse who was a resident of the same household,
the son and mother were found to be covered as relatives because they
were residents of the named insured's household. The court did not
discuss the anomalous fact that its decision granted the wife membership
in two separate households-one with her husband and the other with
her son and mother. The decision is not inequitable from the standpoint
that the wife is afforded the same protection she would have received
if the policy on the vehicle partially owned and used exclusively by her
were written in her name or in the joint names of the former spouses.
Perhaps, rather than straining the definition of "resident," the policy
should have been reformed in light of the agent's full knowledge of
the circumstances.
44. The policy provided coverage for "the named insured and any relative" with no
requirement that they be occupying an insured automobile. The policy defined a "named
insured" as "the individual named in Item I of the declarations and also includes his
spouse, if a resident of the same household."
45. "Relative" was defined as "a relative of the named insured who is a resident
of the same household." Bearden, 437 So. 2d at 1120.
[Vol. 45
DEVELOPMENTS IN THE LA W, 1983-84
Penalties
Any doubt whether the penalty provisions of Louisiana Revised
Statutes 22:658 are applicable to UM claims was dispelled by the Lou-
isiana Supreme Court decision in Hart v. Allstate Insurance Co.4 In
order to comply with the requirement of Louisiana Revised Statutes
22:658 that the insured submit a "satisfactory proof of loss," the court
suggested that it was incumbent upon the UM insured to submit evidence
to the insurer establishing (1) that the owner or operator of the other
vehicle involved in the accident was uninsured or underinsured, (2) that
he was at fault, (3) that such fault gave rise to damages, and (4) the
extent of such damages. 47
AUTOMOBILE LIABILITY COVERAGE
Compulsory Insurance Law/Omnibus Coverage
On July 1, 1978, the Compulsory Motor Vehicle Liability Security
Law became effective. 41 With certain minor exceptions, this act requires
that every motor vehicle registered in this state be covered by a motor
vehicle liability policy as defined by Louisiana Revised Statutes 32:900
or by other specified security. The owner is required 'to certify that the
vehicle is insured or other security is posted when he applies for vehicle
registration or an inspection tag. The applicant can be required to show
evidence of such insurance or security.
To avoid paying excess premiums, the named insured in Fields v.
Western Preferred Casualty Co. 49 accepted an endorsement to his au-
tomobile liability policy which excluded coverage for a specifically named
employee. Unfortunately, the excluded employee was involved in an
accident operating a company vehicle on his last day of work. Louisiana
Revised Statutes 32:900 requires that a motor vehicle liability policy
insure the person named in the policy and any other person using the
motor vehicle with the permission of the named insured. The court held
that the exclusion of a specific driver was in violation of the requirement
of the compulsory insurance law, thus requiring that the policy be
46. 437 So. 2d 823 (La. 1983). For a discussion of the prior jurisprudence, see
McKenzie, Louisiana Uninsured Motorist Coverage-After Twenty Years, 43 La. L. Rev.
691, 730 (1983).
47. 437 So. 2d at 828. No penalties were imposed in Hart. Two recent cases have
awarded penalties plus $5,000 attorney's fees: Cloney v. Smith, 441 So. 2d 342 (La. App.
5th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 So. 2d 608 (La. 1984) (The court concluded that the insurer's
denial of the claim was based upon a "cursory investigation."); Savoy v. Chapmann,
441 So. 2d 21 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1983) (The UM insurer refused to pay its insured for
accident in which liability insurer had denied coverage on the grounds that the tortfeasor's
actions were intentional.).
48. 1977 La. Acts, No. 115, § 1, adding La. R.S. 32:861-865.
49. 437 So. 2d 344 (La. App. 2d Cir.), cert. denied, 440 So. 2d 528, 754 (La. 1983).
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reformed but "only to the extent to make the policy comply with law." 50
The insurer was responsible only for the minimum limits mandated by
law. The Louisiana Supreme Court denied writs.
Louisiana Revised Statutes 32:900(J) specifically provides that the
"requirements for a motor vehicle liability policy may be fulfilled by
the policies of one or more insurance carriers which policies together
meet such requirements." Since the owner is not compelled to purchase
all of the coverage required by Louisiana Revised Statutes 32:900 under
one policy, the Fields decision does not appear to be a proper application
of the statutes unless the insurer expressly certifies that its policy complies
with Louisiana Revised Statutes 32:900.11
50. Id. at 347.
51. For cases which have upheld the exclusion of specified drivers by name or
classification, see Smith v. Western Preferred Cas. Co., 424 So. 2d 375 (La. App. 2d
Cir. 1982) (collision coverage), cert. denied, 427 So. 2d 1212 (La. 1983); Hudson v.
Thompson, 422 So. 2d 640 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1982) (no discussion of La. R.S. 32:900);
Jack v. Adriatic Ins. Co., 420 So. 2d 1292 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1982) (The policy contained
an exclusion for "[Iloss to the automobile which occurs while it is being operated by any
person who does not possess a valid driver's license at the time of the loss." Damages
caused by the unlicensed wife of the insured were not covered.); Wallace v. Boyte Enter.
Inc., 385 So.2d 916 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1980) (exclusion of coverage for everyone except
the named insured if the vehicle is leased to others); Lusk v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co.,
295 So.. 2d 238 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1974) (The court enforced the "Student Risk" en-
dorsement which provided that the policy did not apply "to any person as an insured
who is enrolled as a student at any school, college, or other educational or vocational
institution, except the named insured or a member of his or her family."); Hennigan v.
Savelle, 294 So. 2d 910 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1974) ("Student Risk" endorsement); Maggio
v. Manchester Ins. Co., 292 So. 2d 255 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1974) (The court upheld the
validity of an endorsement to an automobile policy which restricted coverage to the named
insured or members of his immediate family, finding there was no coverage for a person
who was using the automobile with permission and who was not related to the named
insured.); Hurst v. Hardware Mut. Cas. Co., 234 So. 2d 802 (La. App. 1st Cir.), cert.
denied, 256 La. 618, 237 So. 2d 398 (1970). In Pecoraro v. Galvin, 243 So. 2d 307 (La.
App. 4th Cir. 1971), the court found that the vicarious liability of a father for his student
son was covered under a policy issued to another son which contained a "Student Risk"
endorsement because the father, as a resident of the household, was also covered under
the policy and not excluded by the "Student Risk" endorsement. For the applicability
of La. R.S. 32:900 to other policy provisions, see Gotreaux v. Travelers Ins. Co., 299
So. 2d 466 (La. App. 3d Cir.), cert. denied, 302 So. 2d 309 (La. 1974); Crocket v.
Collins, 308 So. 2d 391 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1975).
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